

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 081082

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT ATHENS 2693 SENT SECSTATE INFO ANKARA
DATED APRIL 7.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 2693

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU

SUBJECT: GREEK POSITION ON LEGAL STATUS OF AND TURKISH
INTENTIONS TOWARD ISLANDS OF EASTERN AEGEAN

REF: STATE 077283

1. IN RESPONSE TO AN OFFER TO ELUCIDATE GREEK POSITION ON
LEGAL STATUS OF ISLANDS IN EASTERN AEGEAN, AMBASSADOR,
ACCOMPANIED BY POLMIL OFFICER, CALLED ON FONOFF DIR GEN FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS TZOUNIS EVENING OF APRIL 4. TZOUNIS MADE
CLEAR THE GOG VIEW THAT A FULL APPRECIATION BY THE USG OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 081082

THE COMPLEX LEGAL/HISTORICAL QUESTIONS UNDERLYING THE CURRENT
TENSION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY CONCERNING THESE ISLANDS
WAS ESSENTIAL TO COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIMENSIONS
OF THE PROBLEM. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ISLANDS OF THE

EASTERN AEGEAN FELL INTO THREE GROUPS. THE FIRST, AND NORTHERNMOST, GROUP INCLUDED SAMOTHRACE, LEMNOS, IMBROS, TENEDOS AND THE RABBIT ISLANDS, ALL DEMILITARIZED BY THE SAME PROVISION, ARTICLE 4, OF THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION ON THE TURKISH STRAITS OF 1923 WHICH DEMILITARIZED THE STRAITS. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936 REPLACED THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION AND ABOLISHED THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE STRAITS BE DEMILITARIZED BUT WAS SILENT ON THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS.

2. TZOUNIS NOTED THAT THE DEMILITARIZED STATUS OF LEMNOS WAS DISCUSSED IN NATO IN 1969 WHEN GREECE PROPOSED THAT THE ISLAND'S AIRPORT BE DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE FRIENDLY FORCES IN TIME OF A NATO CRISIS OR WAR. TURKEY OBJECTED, CLAIMING THAT THE ISLAND WAS DEMILITARIZED BY VIRTUE OF THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION ON THE STRAITS OF 1923. TZOUNIS, THEN GREEK AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA, WAS INSTRUCTED TO POINT OUT TO THE GOTS THAT THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED BY THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1936. AFTER STUDYING THE SITUATION, THE GOTS REPLIED THAT THERE WERE SUBSTITUTIONS AND SUBSTITUTIONS, SOME IN TOTO AND SOME PARTIAL, AND THAT MONTREUX ONLY PARTLY REPLACED LAUSANNE. TZOUNIS RECALLED HOW HIS RESEARCH IN THE GREEK EMBASSY FILES UNEARTHED A STATEMENT BY THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER MR. RUSTU ARAS, TO THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (GNA) AT THE TIME THE GOTS SOUGHT RATIFICATION OF THE MONTREUX CONVENTION. ARAS SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE ISLANDS IN QUESTION COULD BE RE-MILITARIZED BECAUSE "THE NEW TURKEY SEEKS FOR ITS NEIGHBORS WHAT IT SEEKS FOR ITSELF." IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS PRESENTATION, THE GNA VOTED AND RATIFIED THE MONTREUX CONVENTION WITHOUT A VOTE IN DISSENT. THERE WAS ALSO AN INDICATION IN THE GREEK EMBASSY FILES THAT AMBASSADOR POLITIS, THE GREEK AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, WHO NEGOTIATED AND SIGNED THE MONTREUX CONVENTION, HAD INDICATED THE STATEMENT OF MR. ARAS WAS PART OF A QUID PRO QUO ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY GREECE SUPPORTED THE TURKISH DESIRE TO FORTIFY THE STRAITS IN RETURN FOR ITS OWN FREEDOM TO DEMILITARIZE THE ISLANDS. TZOUNIS ALSO CITED A DOCUMENT FROM THE GREEK FILES WHICH QUOTED ARAS AS SAYING AFTER THE VOTE THAT HE WAS CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 081082

HAPPY THE GNA HAD VOTED REMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLANDS. WHEN TZOUNIS POINTED OUT THE ARAS STATEMENT TO GOTS FONOFF SECGEN EREZ, THE LATTER SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER, BUT THE GOTS HEARD NOTHING FURTHER. THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION IS IN VOLUME XII, PAGE 309 OF THE JOURNAL OF MINUTES OF THE GNA FOR THE FIFTH PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD, 81ST SESSION OF JULY 31, 1936.

3. THE SECOND AND CENTRAL GROUP OF ISLANDS INCLUDED MYTILENE, CHIOS, SAMOS AND IKARIA. ARTICLE 13 OF THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION ON THE STRAITS, PARTIALLY DEMILITARIZED THESE ISLANDS. NAVAL BASES OR FORTIFICATIONS WERE PROHIBITED, GREEK MILITARY FORCES

WERE LIMITED TO THOSE CALLED TO SERVICE FROM THE ISLAND AND, MOST INTERESTING, OVERFLIGHTS BY GREEK MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF THE ANATOLIAN COAST AND BY TURKISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF THE ISLANDS WERE SPECIFICALLY FORBIDDEN. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THESE ISLANDS REMAINED UNCHANGED. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY THE AMBASSADOR, TZOUNIS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GREECE HAD PUT FORCES ON THE ISLANDS BUT ONLY SINCE THE CYPRUS CRISIS ERUPTED IN JULY 1974. THESE FORCES INCLUDED MILITARY AIRCRAFT ON LEMNOS. IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE REASONS FOR THE RECENT TURKISH OVERFLIGHTS OF THESE ISLANDS, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER GREEK AIRCRAFT HAD OVERFLOWN THE TURKISH MAINLAND. TZOUNIS CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT THIS HAD OCCURRED. TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY AS TO WHETHER THE GOG HAD ADMITTED TO THE GOT ITS MILITARY BUILD-UP ON THESE ISLANDS, TZOUNIS SAID THAT GOT HAD NOT ASKED BUT HAD OVERFLOWN THE ISLANDS, PRESUMABLY PHOTOGRAPHING. TZOUNIS NOTED THAT ARTICLE 13 EXPLICITLY STATED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARIZATION OF THESE ISLANDS WAS "TO ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.."GREECE HAD ONLY ACTED IN RESPONSE TO TURKISH THREATS AND FELT THAT IT COULD NOT LEAVE THE ISLANDS DEFENSELESS.

4. THE THIRD, AND SOUTHERNMOST GROUP OF ISLANDS WAS THE DODECANESE. THESE HAD BEEN CEDED TO ITALY BY TURKEY IN ARTICLE 15 OF THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE OF 1923 AND, IN TURN, BY ITALY TO GREECE UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH ITALY OF 1947. TURKEY HAD RENOUNCED ALL RIGHTS AND TITLED TO THESE ISLANDS IN THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE. THUS, TURKEY'S CLAIM TO CONTINENTAL SHELF RESOURCES WEST OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 081082

DODECANESE WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH TREATY UNDERTAKINGS TO WHICH TURKEY SUPPOSEDLY STILL SUBSCRIBED. IN 1931 AND 1932 ITALY AND TURKEY NEGOTIATED TWO PROTOCOLS, ONE COVERING THE SEA BOUNDARY BETWEEN CASTELORIZON AND THE TURKISH MAINLAND AND THE OTHER BETWEEN THE DODECANESE AND THE ANATOLIAN COAST. TURKEY RATIFIED THE FIRST BUT DID NOT RATIFY THE SECOND. TZOUNIS NOTED THAT THE 1947 TREATY STATED THE DODECANESE "SHALL BE AND SHALL REMAIN DEMILITARIZED." HE ADDED THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS DEMILITARIZATION DEFINED IN ANNEX 13, SECTION D OF THE TREATY OF 1947 PROHIBITED ANYTHING LARGER THAN HAND-HELD WEAPONS. TURKEY WAS NOT A SIGNATORY

OF THE 1947 TREATY AND THUS WAS NOT A PARTY TO IT. AGAIN, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GREECE HAD SENT TROOPS INTO THE DODECANESE IN ORDER TO DEFEND THEM AFTER REPEATED THREATENING STATEMENTS BY TURKISH LEADERS. HE QUOTED A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS MADE IN THE PAST YEAR BY TURKISH GOVERNMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY LEADERS CLAIMING RIGHTS TO THE AEGEAN AND SUGGESTING A KIND OF "MANIFEST DESTINY" FOR TURKEY TO EXTEND ITS BORDERS TO THE CENTRAL AEGEAN, ALL OF WHICH CREATED CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSIONS ABOUT TURKISH

INTENTIONS. TZOUNIS COMMENTED THAT ALL THE ISLANDS IN QUESTION WERE PART OF GREECE'S NATIONAL TERRITORY AND THAT THEY WOULD BE DEFENDED, ADDING THAT "THE TURKS MUST KNOW THIS."

5. TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION REGARDING FORTIFICATIONS ON THE DODECANNESE TZOUNIS REPLIED THERE WERE NO PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS BUT PERHAPS SOME FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF ASSURANCES FROM TURKEY THAT IT HAD NO AGGRESSIVE INTENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW GREECE TO LEAVE THE ISLANDS DEMILITARIZED. TZOUNIS REPLIED THAT ASSURANCES WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH AS THE TURKS WOULD INTERPRET THEM AS THEY SAW FIT. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT THEN WOULD BE SUFFICIENT AND TZOUNIS SAID RATHER THAN ASSURANCES A TRUE DETENTE WAS NEEDED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, TZOUNIS STATED THAT TROOPS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE DODECANNESE ONLY SINCE JULY 1974, BUT ADDED THAT THEY HAD PROBABLY ALSO BEEN SENT AT THE TIME OF THE 1967 CRISIS. TZOUNIS EXPANDED, SAYING THAT GREECE PLACED TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS ONLY IN TIMES OF CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 081082

CRISIS WHEN THE ISLANDS WERE THREATENED BY TURKEY. TZOUNIS CHARACTERIZED AS WITHOUT FOUNDATION THE TURKISH REFERENCE TO THE "HEGHALI IDEA" AS JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS MILITARY PROVOCATIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE "MEGHALI IDEA" HAD HAD SUBSTANCE ONLY WHEN THERE WAS DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS, WHEN THERE WERE ONE AND ONE-HALF MILLION GREEKS LIVING IN ANATOLIA. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE TURKS SUSPECTED A GREEK MILITARY MOVE AND TZOUNIS SAID CLEARLY NOT, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS' STATEMENTS THAT GREECE WOULD NOT INITIATE ANY MILITARY ACTION. TZOUNIS REFERRED TO ANY THOUGHT THAT GREECE MIGHT HAVE AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS TOWARD THE MAINLAND WHEN IT PUT TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS AS "INSANE." WHEN THE AMBASSADOR QUERIED TZOUNIS ABOUT POSSIBLE EXCHANGES CONCERNING THE ISLANDS BETWEEN THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS, TZOUNIS STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DEMARCHE ON THE ISLANDS SINCE JUNE 1974. AT THAT TIME, THE TURKS HAD MENTIONED THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS AS ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT IT WISHED TO DISCUSS WHEN TALKS BETWEEN THEN FOREIGN MINISTERS BAYULKEN AND CAVALIERATOS ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE AGREED.

6. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT BY ACCIDENT OR BY HAPPENSTANCE SOME SHIP CAPTAIN OR AIRCRAFT PILOT MIGHT TAKE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD LEAD TO HOSTILITIES WITHOUT THE INTENT TO DO SO ON EITHER SIDE. TZOUNIS REPLIED THAT GREECE WAS EXERCISING RESTRAINT BUT COULD NOT ALLOW OVERFLIGHTS, PARTICULARLY AT LOW LEVEL, WHICH INDUCED PANIC AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULACE ON THE ISLANDS AND CREATED UNCERTAINTIES WHICH HAD ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS THROUGHOUT GREECE, SUCH AS BANK WITHDRAWALS,

HOARDING AND DISCOURAGEMENT OF THE IMPORTANT TOURIST TRADE. THE AMBASSADOR AFCEC IF THE GOG WISHED THE U.S. TO DO ANYTHING AND TZOUNIS REPLIED NEGATIVELY, SAYING THAT THE GOG JUST WISHED THE U.S. TO BE INFORMED.

7. TZOUNIS REFERRED TO RECENT REPORTS THAT GOG HAD RECEIVED FROM ITS CONGEN IN ISTANBUL THAT THE TURKS WERE QUITLY, BY INDIVIDUAL CALLS, MOBILIZING FOUR CLAF ES, THOSE OF 1948, 1949, 1950 AND 1952. THIS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH REPORTS THAT TURKISH HEADQUARTERS AT THE DIVISION AND CORPS LEVEL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 081082

WRE MOVING TO FIELD POSITIONS IN THRACE AS WELL AS THE RECENT PUBLIC REPORT THAT TURKEY WAS CREATING A NEW FIELD ARMY COMMAND FOR THE AEGEAN AREA HEADQUARTERS IN IZMIR, GAVE THE GOG CONSIDERABLE CAUSE FOR CONERN. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER TZOUNIS FELT THE TURKS WERE PLANNING SOMETHING FOR THEIR OWN REASONS OR BECAUSE THEY SUSPECTED GREEK INTENTIONS. TZOUNIS FELT THAT TURKEY WAS TRYING TO INTIMIDATE GREECE AS WELL AS OVERFLYING THE ISLANDS TO SEE WHAT GREECE WAS DOING. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT THE TURKS PERHAPS WERE SIMPLY OBSERVING THE GREEKS BUT WOULD NOT ACTUALLY INITIATE HOSTILITIES. TZOUNIS HOPED THIS WAS THE CASE, ADDING THAT ANY HOSTILITIES WOULD HAVE VERY ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS FOR ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIETS, WHO REGARDED TH DARDANELLES AS VITAL TO THEIR INTERESTS. HE RECALLED THAT THE RUSSIAN FLEET HAD HAD A BASE IN POROS DURING THE 19TH CENTURY AND ONLY SOVIET INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION HAD ACCUSTOMED PEOPLE TO THE CONCEPT THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE A CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SOVIET SQUADRON INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN IN RECENT YEARS WAS A REASSERTION OF AN OLD INTEREST.

8. TZOUNIS SAW A PATTERN IN THE EFFORT BY THE TURKS OVER THE LAST DECADE TO RE-ALIGN THE NATO COMMAND BOUNDARIES IN THE AEGEAN, WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN TO COINCIDE WITH THE TERRITORIAL SEA LIMITS OF TURKEY IN THE AEGEAN WHEN GREECE AND TURKEY ENTERED NATO. THIS EFFORT, THE TURKIISH ASSERTION OF A CLAIM TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, THE UNILATERAL EXTENSION OF THE TURKISH FIR, AND THEN THE PROVOCATIVE OVERFLIGHTS ALL APPEARED TO GREECE TO BE AN EFFORT BY TURKEY TO ESTABLISH DEFACTO JOINT OR UNILATERAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES IN THE AEGEAN. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IF THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A CONFRONTATION AND PERHAPS HOSTILITIES AS A RESULT OF MISUNDERSTANDING BY EACH SIDE OF THE OTHER'S INTENTIONS, THIRD PARTIES COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. TZOUNIS, IMPLICITLY ACCEPTING THIS, COMMENTED THAT TH TURKS CALCULATED THAT GREECE WAS IN A PERIOD OF WEAKNESS AFTER SEVEN YEARS OF POLITICAL ISOLATION, BECAUSE OF MATERIEL DEFICIENCIES IN GREECE'S ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY THE EARLIER FAILURE TO RENEW THE AIRCRAFT INVENTORY OF THE

HAF, AND BECAUSE OF THE ASSUMED WEAKNESS OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP
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PAGE 07 STATE 081082

IN GREECE FOLLOWING THE MANY TURNOVERS OF RECENT YEARS. THE
AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION THAT GREECE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM
NATO'S MILITARY WING MIGHT ALSO MAKE IT APPEAR MORE
VULNERABLE DREW A GRUDGING AGREEMENT FROM TZOUNIS.

9. TZOUNIS THEN MENTIONED REPORTS THE GOG HAD RECEIVED
THAT TURKEY MIGHT FEEL BECAUSE OF INCIPIENT DEFICIENCIES IN
ITS OWN MATERIAL READINESS THE PERIOD UP TO JUNE WAS
THE MOST OPPORTUNE TIME TO ACT. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHY
THEN DID FOTINIS NOT WISH THE USG TO MAKE THE PUBLIC
STATEMENT DISCUSSED IN DECEMBER IN BRUSSELS, AND TZOUNIS
ATTRIBUTED THIS RELUCTANCE TO FOTINIS' FEELING THAT THE
CYPRIOTS MIGHT THINK THAT THE GOG WAS ABANDONING THEM IN FAVOR OF
A USG GUARANTEE OF ITS OWN SECURITY. TZOUNIS
REFERRED TO THE UNITED STATES INTEREST IN PREVENTING
HOSTILITIES IN THE AEGEAN AND THE AMBASSADOR RECALLED THAT IN
BOTH DECEMBER AND EARLY MARCH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD
INDICATED TO FOREIGN MINISTER FOTINIS THAT THE SITUATION WITH
RESPECT TO THE GREEK ISLANDS IN THE AEGEAN WAS DIFFERENT FROM
CYPRUS AND THAT THE USG COULD NOT TOLERATE A MILITARY ACTION
BY TURKEY THERE. THE AMBASSADOR CAUTIONED TZOUNIS THAT
THE GOG WOULD LOSE THE SUPPORT OF THE WORLD IF IT INITIATED
ANY MILITARY ACTION ITSELF. TZOUNIS REPLIED THAT THE USG
COULD REST ASSURED THAT GREECE WOULD NOT START ANYTHING BUT
ADDED THAT IT COULD NOT ALLOW THE OVERFLIGHTS TO CONTINUE.

9. WE WILL BE COMMENTING ON SEPTTEL ON QUESTIONS POSED IN
REFTEL.
KUBISCH UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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